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•	 Since	 taking	 power	 in	 China	 in	 2012,	 Xi	 Jinping	 has	 effected	
a	 fundamental	 change	 in	Beijing’s	 foreign	policy,	 abandoning	
the	principle	of	limited	external	activity.	China	has	undertaken	
initiatives	to	satisfy	its	territorial	claims	in	the	South	and	East	
China	Seas,	 shape	 its	neighbourhood,	 and	build	 and	promote	







tion	 regarding	 China’s	 vision	 of	 the	world	 has	 lost	 its	 purely	
academic	nature.	The	extent	to	which	the	Chinese	ruling	elites	
are	ready	to	adjust	to	the	present	political	and	economic	liberal	

































also	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 scale	 of	 Beijing’s	 international	 ambi-
tions.	China	is	striving	to	build	durable	influence	in	the	coun-
tries	 of	 its	 neighbourhood,	 which	 would	 be	 independent	 of	






















on	 remain	unclear.	This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
a	unilateral	 initiative	created	by	 the	Chinese	 side	alone.	 In	
this	situation,	China	is	unwilling	to	institutionalise	the	pro-




























































those	promoted	by	Western	 states,	 on	 the	Chinese	vision	of	 the	
international	order	(External	influence).	The	final	part	examines	
the	question	of	to	what	extent	China	would	be	ready	to	take	over	

















I. THE ‘CHINESE SPHINX’




al	 economic	 crisis	 of	 the	 years	 2008–2009.	 China	 survived	 this	
crisis	as	one	of	the	countries	 least	affected	from	among	the	ma-
jor	actors	and,	as	a	consequence,	has	reduced	the	distance	which	





The ongoing debate in the West can be divided into two lines: 
the optimistic one and the pessimistic one.	Supporters	of	the	op-
timistic	version	argue	that	China	is	adjusting	to	the	Western	liberal	
order,	citing	China’s	membership	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	
its	 increasing	economic	 ties	with	 the	external	world	and	greater	





gressive	behaviour	and	 territorial	claims	 in	 the	South	China	Sea	




Since	 the	 early	 2000s,	 the	 commentators’	 community	 has	 been	
largely	optimistic,	as	reflected	in	slogans	such	as	China’s	‘peace-
ful	 rise’	 and	 its	assuming	 the	role	of	a	 ‘responsible	 stakeholder’	
in	international	order.	However,	over	the	last	two	or	three	years	















‘China’s assertiveness’ and of rising Chinese-American rival-
ry.	China’s	actions	are	being	increasingly	referred	to	as	attempts	










power	 in	 2012	Xi Jinping has managed to correct China’s ap-





several	 members	 of	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	 Communist	
Party	of	China1.	In	foreign	policy,	the	principle	abandoned	was	the	
policy	of	limited	and	cautious	involvement	in	international	affairs	
(‘keeping	 a	 low	 profile’).	 Over	 recent	 decades,	 China	 has	 signifi-
cantly	opened	itself	up	to	the	world	and	involved	itself	in	multilat-
eral	cooperation	with	its	neighbours	within	ASEAN	and	the	Shang-
hai	Cooperation	Organisation.	At	 the	same	 time,	Chinese	 leaders	
did	not	show	any	particular	ambitions	in	the	international	arena,	
which	in	practice	meant	that	China	remained	outside	of	political	





















pursued	the	majority	of	 its	 foreign	policy	 in	 the	bilateral	 format,	
focusing	on	building	economic	ties,	opening	foreign	markets	to	its	
exports	and	importing	technology.







of	 the	most	publicly	 engaged	experts	 in	 international	 relations,	
in	 China’s	 policy	 “maintaining	 a	 low	profile”	 has	 been	 replaced	






opments.	Voices	 in	 favour	 of	 considering	 the	need	 to	 build	 alli-
ances	began	to	emerge	in	Chinese	debate4.





tory,	The Chinese Journal of International Politics,	8:2,	2015,	p.	197–218;	Sheng	
Ding,	A	Concealed	Regionalization	without	Historical	Roots:	A	New	Form	of	
Regionalism	in	Rising	China’s	Foreign	Policy,	in	Emilian	Kavalski	(ed.),	China 



























































II. CHINA DREAMS OF A COMMUNITY













by	2049,	 i.e.	 one	hundred	years	 since	 the	establishment	of	 the	
People’s	Republic	of	China.	However, not all of these slogans 
reflect China’s thinking of the external world and its evolu-
tion in the same way.
Firstly,	 it	 is	 an	 element	 of	 political	 and	 bureaucratic	 culture,	
and	a	particular	ritual,	for the new leader to introduce their 




a	 ‘harmonious	world’	 to	 be	 based	 on	multilateralism,	 economic	




































how	 Chinese	 elites	 interpret	 international	 reality.	 The	 above-
mentioned	 slogans	 reflect	 certain	 Sinocentric ideas.	 Slogans	




region	 and	 the	 neighbourhood.	 Xi	 has	 also	 called	 for	 a	unique 
Chinese approach towards diplomacy,	 to	 be	 characterised	by	
the	necessity	to	build	global	partnerships	based	on	the	principle	
of	non-involvement.
Similarly,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 ideas	 promoted	 are	 ones	which	
would	 have	 a	 strong potential to attract possible partners.	
The	most	 important	of	 these	 ideas	 is	 the	 ‘community of desti-
ny’.	When	promoting	this	 idea,	Xi	has	pointed	to	the	priority	of	
relationships	 with	 the	 neighbours	 (‘periphery	 diplomacy’),	 and	
deemed	 them	more	 important	 than	 the	 relationships	with	 spe-
cific	 powers.	He	 also	 emphasised	 the	need	 for	China	 to	use	 the	



































At	 the	 same	 time,	 frequent	 references	 to	 ‘the new type of in-
ternational relations’	 and	to	 ‘the new type great powers re-
lations’	 suggest	 that	China	remains	sceptical	about	 the	present	
international	order,	and	would	like	to	replace	it	with	a	version	of	
this	 order	which	would	 be	 devised	with	Beijing’s	 participation.	



















III. GLOBALISATION – THE CHINESE WAY 
The	New	Silk	Road	and	the	AIIB	bank	are	attempts	to	transform	
general	ideas	into	a	specific	vision	of	international	order	in	Asia	
and	 Eurasia.	 The New Silk Road is China’s unilateral initia-
tive,	for	which	Beijing	is	seeking	partners.	The AIIB, on the other 
hand, is a typical multilateral institution,	a	development	bank	










































Road	 involving	 the	 construction	 of	 infrastructural	 connections	





cept is not limited to one region. This openness is tantamount 
to a desire for the globalisation rather the than regionalisa-
tion of international politics.	The	composition	of	the	Asian	In-





be	 included	 in	 China’s	 vision	 of	 international	 order.	 The fact 
that the USA and Japan have been omitted	clearly shows that	
China views its project as one that is competitive with other 
regional initiatives, both American and Japanese.	According	
to	 some	 researchers,	 this	 is	 because	 priority	 is	 no	 longer	 given	









The principles and norms on which China intends to base its 

















remain unclear.	 This	 largely	 results	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
a	 unilateral	 initiative	which,	 in	 contrast	 to	 declarations,	 is	 be-
ing	created	by	the	Chinese	side	alone.	Beijing	shows	no	intention	




the	general	principles	China	would	 like	 to	apply	 to	 its	 relations	
with	 its	 partners	 in	 the	New	 Silk	 Road	 project.	 Beijing	 has	 not	
moved	beyond	general	statements	such	as	‘win-win	cooperation’.	
The	 focus	 on	 specific	 infrastructural	 initiatives	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
universal	 standards	are	 intended	 to	 show	China’s	 friendly	 face,	












































reflected	 in	 the	 level	of	funding which China has earmarked 
for the project’s implementation.	There	are	two	main	sources	
of	this	funding.	The	first,	that	depends	on	Beijing	alone,	is	the	Silk	
Road	 Fund	which	 has	 US$40	 billion	 at	 its	 disposal.	 The	 second	
source	is	the	AIIB	bank,	whose	initial	capital	amounts	to	US$100	
billion.	This	is	supplemented	by	individual	initiatives	carried	out	




investments	may	 be	 funded	 by	 the	 Silk	 Road	 Fund	 or	 the	 AIIB	



















IV. THE IMPERIAL HERITAGE…
China’s	 vision	 of	 international	 order	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	
the	country’s	history.	It	should	be	noted	that	China’s	history	and	
the	history	of	China’s	activity	on	the	international	stage	contain	




























































China’s	preference for bilateral relations	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	
country’s	history.	China	prefers	flexible	bilateral	relations.	This	
has	 prompted	 some	 researchers	 to	 conclude	 that	 China	 has	 no	
strategy,	as	understood	as	a	set	of	universal	 rules	of	how	to	deal	
with	 the	external	world.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 rules	are	adjusted	 to	





















































V. … AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
Numerous	 researchers	 refer	 to	China	as	 a	power	 that	 is	 ‘learn-
ing’	international	politics.	Both	the	New Silk Road concept and 
the AIIB bank show that Western ideas have considerably 






















ly	associated	with	China’s support for the concept of globali-




















attempts	 include	 the	Trans-Pacific	 Partnership	 (TPP)	 promoted	
by	the	United	States	and	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	promoted	
by	Russia.



































China’s	concepts	 in	the	states	at	which	China’s	policy	 is	 targeted	
is	an	even	bigger	challenge	for	Beijing.	However,	even	in	the	pres-
ence	of	these	reservations,	it	would	be	good	to	establish	what kind 










As	a	consequence,	several	domestic tensions	are	present	in the 
Chinese vision of international order:



















c)	 between	 the	 will	 to	 independently	 lead	 the	 construction	 of	
the	region	and	consent	to	let	others	take	part	in	the	decision-
making	process.	
China	 is	 trying	 to	balance the bilateral and the multilateral 
dimensions of its foreign policy.	On	the	one	hand,	Beijing	has	





the	same	 time,	Beijing	 is	 trying	 to	build	 its	 influence	 in	a	more	











Under	the	New	Silk	Road	initiative,	China intends to build up 
durable influence in the states located in its neighbourhood,	
which	 would	 be	 independent	 of	 potential	 domestic	 changes.	





























This	 approach	 is	 also	 a	method	 of	 concealing	 China’s	 economic	









The	New	Silk	Road	 is	an attempt to build a parallel interna-
tional order, rather than one that would be an alternative to 
the liberal international order.	The	project	is	not	protectionist	
and	closed	–	on	the	contrary,	 it	 is	open	and	oriented	at	stronger	
economic	 cooperation.	 The	 fact	 that	 European	 countries	 were	
invited	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 AIIB	 and	 that	 attempts	 have	 been	
made	 to	 include	 the	 Eurasian	 Economic	Union	 in	 the	New	 Silk	
Road	 shows	 that	China	 is	 trying	 to	 complement	 the	present	or-
der	rather	than	replace	it	with	its	own	institutions.	At	the	same	
time,	 China	 intends	 to	 present	 poorer	 states	 with	 an	 offer	 the	
West	 never	 had	 for	 them:	 to	 provide	 them	with	 infrastructure	
























The question regarding the durability of this vision of the in-




expected	 that	 the	next	 leader	will	want	 to	present	 a	new	set	 of	
slogans	and	ideas.	At	the	same	time,	it	should	be	remembered	that	
the	previous	vision	promoted	by	Deng	Xiaoping	has	proved	to	be	
very	resistant	to	change,	and	has	continued	to	shape	China’s	be-
haviour	on	the	international	stage	for	over	30	years,	even	though	
subsequent	leaders	of	China	have	continued	to	add	their	own	in-
terpretations	to	it.
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